Abstract
Introduction

33
Preventative risk management has re-emerged as a central tenet of drinking water 34 provision following the active promotion of the multibarrier approach (see Havelaar, 1994) , Smeets et al. 2008) . Risk analysis tools may provide valuable support to process design 38 and optimisation (Pollard et al. 2004 ), but in isolation, and without being embedded an 39 organisational culture of risk management, are limited in their ability to prevent incidents 40 (Choudhrya et al. 2007) . The authors of this paper have a long standing research interest in 41 implementing preventative risk management among water suppliers, and in the role that to an extent that we believe a formal analysis of human reliability would be beneficial in 50 preventing disease outbreaks. Here, we present a secondary analysis of Hrudey and obvious parallels with the multi-barrier approach that includes several layers of defence to 55 prevent water from contaminantion (Havelaar, 1994) . Such defences include source water 56 assessment and protection, the identification and correction of system defects, proper 57 maintenance of the well and distribution system, the appropriate use of disinfection where 58 necessary, and monitoring. We are interested in how we might extend Reason's analogy to 59 improve human reliability in water supply operations, with the assistance of HRA (Kirwan, 60 1996; Kirwan et al. 1997; Kirwan, 1997) .
61
Research attention in the reliability and maintenance community has conventionally 62 been centred on physical and software systems. Industrial accidents were historically 63 characterised in terms of technological malfunctions, and the human element in the cause of 64 the accident tended to be overlooked (Gordon, 1998) . A new subject, HRA, has attracted 65 researchers' attention since the 1980s, especially since the post-mortem analyses of fatal 66 accidents often highlights the critical role played by human error. It is suggested that the 67 cause of about 80% of all accidents can be attributed to human error (Whittingham, 2003) .
68
The term 'human reliability' is usually defined as the probability that a person will 69 correctly perform some system-required activity during a given time period, without 70 performing any extraneous activity that might degrade the system. HRA arose from the 71 need to describe incorrect human actions in the context of probabilistic risk assessment
72
(PRA) or probabilistic safety analyses (PSA) Hollnagel, 2000) .
73
2 Error and human reliability analysis 99 HRA applies relevant information about human characteristics and behaviour to the 100 design of objects, facilities, processes and environments that people use (Grandjean, 1980 
Error classification
109
Error classification describes the types of errors that humans make. A number of 110 taxonomies exist (Meister, 1971; Swain and Guttman, 1983; Reason 1990 A brief description of each of the levels and their associated taxonomies is given below.
145
• Unsafe acts are largely due to operators. (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) , HEART (Williams, 1986) , SLIM (Embrey, 1984) , ASEP
170
(Swain 1987), TESEO (Bello and Colombari, 1980) and HCR (Hannaman, 1984) . The 171 second generation tools include ATHEANA (Cooper et.al. 1996) , CREAM (Hollnagel, 172 1998 ), or MERMOS (Bieder, 1998 . By illustration, in the HEART methodology, the 173 failure rate is estimated using an empirical expression of the form: (Table 7) . A distribution of the main errors is shown in Table 7 , the main contributions of error involved the following:
315
• customers sensed abnormalities, but failed to report to their water supplier;
316
• customers sensed abnormalities, reported to their water suppliers, but the supplier 317 then failed to respond to the reports;
318
• customer sensed abnormalities and reported to their water suppliers which 319 responded to the reports, and accidents were successfully prevented. These may 320 have happened in many cases but have not been reported. sector. An on-line tool may be useful for this purpose.
381
• Development of effective warning systems. For the new slice in Figure 5 , • Staff intentionally kept chlorine levels low (AE)
• Failed to effectively respond to warning signals (AE)
• Physical system failure (PE)
11 Rome, Georgia, USA, August 1980
• Poor isolation of the textile plant distribution system from the drinking water system (LE) • Failed to protect the water supply system (AE) 12 Grums and Valberg, Varmland, Sweden, Oct 1980
• Failed to isolate the water supply system from the river water irrigation systems (LE)
13 Eagle-Vail, Colorado, USA, Mar 1981
• Inadequate operation (LE)
• Failed to investigate an alarm (AE)
• Failed to equip with effective barriers (LE)
14 Mjovik, Blekinge, Sweden, Oct 1992
• Failure of a sewer system (PE)
• Failed to provide disinfection in the water system (LE)
• Failed to know the system thoroughly (AE)
15 Drumheller, Alberta, Canada, Feb 1983
• Failure in a physical system (PE)
• Extreme weather (PE)
• A lack of cooperation or interaction among various parties (CTE)
• Failed to issue a boil water advisory earlier (AE)
• Failed to recognise vulnerable situation of sewage pump station (AE)
• Operating winter treatment without coagulation made system vulnerable (LE)
• Incorrect judgement that unprotected surface water can be supplied to consumers without any treatment barriers (AE) • Infected animal (PE) 34 Naas, Count Kildare, Ireland, Oct 1991
• Failurein the physical system (PE)
• Consumers failed to report warnings (CTE)
35 Uggelose, Denmark, Dec 1991-Jan 1992
• Failure of a physical system (PE)
• Failed to respond to queries about the potential dangers posed by a connection (LE) • Failed to signal sufficient warnings despite a risk having been raised (AE)
